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The ongoing tragedy in Darfur' reminds us every day how enormous the
challenge is at the international level to protect human rights of individuals and
groups suffering from the excesses of tyrannical regimes. A similar grim situation
faces those who live in failed states. The existing international machinery is ill-
equipped, inadequate, and ineffective for providing the needed protection. As the
U.N. Secretary-General noted in his March 2005 follow-up report to the outcome
of the Millennium Summit, "[cihange is needed if the United Nations is to sustain
long-term, high-level engagement on human rights issues, across the range of the
Organization's work.",2 He emphasized the need to strengthen the U.N. human
rights machinery by providing more resources and staff within the Office of the
U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR).3 He called for the human
rights treaty bodies to be more effective and more responsive to violations of the
rights under their mandate, which in turn necessitates the finalization and
implementation of uniform guidelines on reporting to all treaty bodies.4
Noting that the Security Council is fully authorized under the U.N. Charter to
use military force, including preventively, to preserve international peace and
security when there exist latent threats, the Secretary-General asked rhetorically,
"[a]s to genocide, ethnic cleansing and other such crimes against humanity, are
they not also threats to international peace and security, against which humanity
* Vice Provost and John Evans University Professor, University of Denver; Thompson G. Marsh
Professor of Law and Director, International Legal Studies Program, University of Denver Sturm
College of Law.
1. See, e.g., Joel Brinkley, Plan to End Darfur Violence is Failing, Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 28, 2006, at A3 (violence and chaos seem to grow as the broad strategy of ending the conflict is
collapsing, according to U.N. and Bush administration officials. At the urging of Secretary-General
Kofi Annan, the U.N. is considering deploying a larger peacekeeping force to replace that of the
African Union); Evelyn Leopold, Annan Wants US, Europe to Consider Force in Darfur, REUTERS,
Jan. 13, 2006 (U.N. wants the U.S. and European countries to send forces to stop the bloodshed in
Darfur). See also, U.N. COMM'N OF INQUIRY ON DARFUR, Report of the International Commission of
Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General, (25 January 2005) [hereinafter Darfur
Report].
2. The Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human
Rights for all, Report of the Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security
and Human Rights for All, 141, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005 (March 21,
2005) [hereinafter In Larger Freedom].
3. Id. paras. 142-146.
4. Id. para. 147.
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should be able to look to the Security Council for protection?"5  He also took
special note of the need to replace the discredited U.N. Commission on Human
Rights by a smaller and more effective standing Human Rights Council.6
Subsequently, Heads of State and Government who met at a World Summit at
U.N. Headquarters in New York from September 14-16, 2005, agreed in principle
to strengthen the U.N. machinery on human rights.7  However, the
recommendations were in general terms, leaving the specifics for the General
Assembly to decide at a later date. A promising development, however, was the
agreement on the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes,
ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.8
I will discuss here a few promising new developments that should result in
enhancing the protection of human rights. The first such development is the
recognition by U.N. member states of a "responsibility to protect their populations;
the second is their promise to strengthen the Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights; and last is the decision by member states to replace the U.N.
Commission on Human Rights by an effective Human Rights Council.
II. THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT POPULATIONS FROM GENOCIDE, WAR
CRIMES, ETHNIC CLEANSING, AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY
The need to protect victims of civil wars, collapsed states, and repressive state
practices resulting in massive violation of human rights is undeniable. However,
controversy surrounds the claim that there exists a valid right to intervene by
military action against a state on humanitarian grounds to protect peoples at risk in
that state. 9 Although the United Nations took coercive action, invoking a Chapter
VII determination that the humanitarian crisis was'a threat to international peace
and security, to protect the Kurds from Saddam Hussein's brutality after the first
Gulf War,' 0 the shameful inaction of the world community in the face of the
Rwandan genocide as the screams of hundreds of thousands of innocent men,
women, and children being massacred fell on deaf ears in the Security Council;
there was soul-searching the world over on how to protect such victims. Questions
5. Id. para. 125.
6. Id. paras. 181-183.
7. G.A. Res. 60/1, 123-126, 138-140, 157-160, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Oct. 24, 2005)
[hereinafter World Summit Outcome].
8. Id. paras. 138-140.
9. See, e.g., V.S. Mani, Humanitarian Intervention Today, 313 RECUEIL DES COURS 13-323
(2005); F. TESON, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW AND MORALITY (2d ed.
1996); HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS (R. Lillich ed. 1973); Ved Nanda,
Tragedies in Northern Iraq, Liberia, Yugoslavia, and Haiti -- Revisiting the Validity of Humanitarian
Intervention Under International Law -- Part 1, 20 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 305 (1992) (hereinafter
Nanda, Humanitarian Intervention - Pt 1); Ved Nanda, Tragedies in Somalia, Yugoslavia, Haiti,
Rwanda and Liberia -- Revisiting the Validity of Humanitarian Intervention Under International Law --
Part 11, 26 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 827 (1998); Thomas G. Weiss, The Sunset of Humanitarian
Intervention? The Responsibility to Protect in a Unipolar Era, 35 SECURITY DIALOGUE 135 (2004).
10. See Nanda, Humanitarian Intervention - Pt 1, supra note 9, at 330-334.
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were being raised as to whether along with the rights associated with sovereignty
there was not also an obligation on a sovereign to protect those under its
jurisdiction.
Along with academic writing on the subject, several governments took policy
initiatives to consider the question. Among the major initiatives were those by the
Danish government, 1 the Dutch government, 12 the Swedish government, and the
Clinton administration.' 3 The Canadian initiative, that of the International
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), is the most influential
of all these initiatives and was undertaken in response to the challenges posed by
Secretary-General Annan in his General Assembly addresses, first in 1999 and
then again in 2000. This initiative issued a report, entitled "The Responsibility to
Protect." 4 n Kofi Annan's words, "if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an
unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a
Srebrenica-to gross and systematic violations of human rights that affect every
precept of our common humanity?"' 15 The government of Canada had established
the ICISS in cooperation with a group of major foundations. It may be recalled that
the 1999 NATO intervention in Kosovo had taken place in the face of a seeming
paralysis and inaction at the United Nations. 16
After deliberations on legal, moral, operational, and political aspects of the
issue, and after wide consultations around the world, the Commission concluded
that as an exceptional and extraordinary measure, military intervention for human
protection purposes is warranted only when there is:
[S]erious and irreparable harm occurring to human beings, or
imminently likely to occur, of the following kind: A. large-scale loss of
life, actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent or not, which is the
product either of deliberate state action, or state neglect or inability to
act, or a failed state situation; or B. large-scale 'ethnic cleansing', actual
or apprehended, whether carried out by killing, forced expulsion, acts of
17
terror or rape.
According to the Commission this was the "just cause" threshold. It outlined
four precautionary principles to guide the use of force-right intention, last resort,
proportional means, and reasonable prospects of success-in halting or averting
11. Danish Institute of International Affairs, Humanitarian Intervention: Legal and Political
Aspects (1999).
12. Advisory Council on International Affairs & Advisory Committee on Issues of Public
International Law, Humanitarian Intervention (2000).
13. Independent International Commission on Kosovo, KOsOVO REPORT: CONFLICT,
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE, LESSONS LEARNED (2000).
14. Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The
Responsibility to Protect (Dec. 2001) [hereinafter ICISS Report].
15. Quoted in id. at vii.
16. See, e.g., Ved Nanda, NATO's Armed Intervention in Kosovo and International Law, 10
USAFA J. LEG. STUD. 1 (1999-2000).
17. ICISS Report, supra note 14, at xii.
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the suffering "with the consequences of action not likely to be worse than the
consequences of inaction."' 8
Earlier, in the mid-1990s, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General
on Internally Displaced Persons, Francis Deng, had already advocated the
responsibility concept pertaining to sovereignty in his studies-in 1995, Frontiers
of Sovereignty,'9 and in 1996 (co-authored with others), Sovereignty as
Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa.2 °
It was, however, the Canadian study on the topic that received most attention
of Member States and the United Nations, and the document adopted by the
September 2005 Summit of Heads of State and Government reflects the study's
recommendations.
Kofi Annan again broached the subject in his September 2003 address to the
General Assembly as he urged the Security Council members:
[T]o engage in serious discussions of the best way to respond to threats
of genocide or other comparable massive violations of human rights-
an issue which I raised myself from this podium in 1999. Once again
this year, our collective response to events of this type-in the




Subsequently, he established a High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and
Change of eminent persons to examine the current challenges to peace and security
and the contribution that collective action can make in addressing these challenges.
In its December 2004 report, the High-Level Panel observed that currently
state sovereignty "clearly carries with it the obligation of a State to protect the
welfare of its own peoples and meet its obligations to the wider international
community. '22  However, when a state is unable or unwilling to meet this
responsibility, "the principles of collective security mean that some portion of
those responsibilities should be taken up by the international community .... ,23
After noting that "[c]ollective security institutions have proved particularly
poor at meeting the challenge posed by large-scale, gross human rights abuses and
genocide ' 24 and acknowledging Rwanda as the biggest failure,25 and further noting
that the humanitarian disasters in Somalia, Bosnia, Rwanda, Kosovo, and Darfur
18. Id.
19. Francis M. Deng, Frontiers of Sovereignty, 8 LEIDEN J. INT'L. L. 249 (1995).
20. FRANCIS M. DENG, ET AL., SOVEREIGNTY AS RESPONSIBILITY: CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN
AFRICA (1996).
21. Secretary-General's Address to the General Assembly, U.N. NEWS CENTRE, Sept. 23, 2003,
available at www.un.org/apps/sg/printsgstats.asp?nid=517.
22. U.N. General Assembly, Note by the Secretary-General: A More Secure World, Our Shared
Responsibility -- Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, U.N. Doc.
A/59/565, para. 29, Dec. 2, 2004 [hereinafter High-Level Panel Report].
23. Id.
24. Id. para. 36.
25. Id. para. 87.
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"have concentrated attention not on the immunities of sovereign Governments but
their responsibilities, both to their own people and to the wider international
community," the Panel stated:
[T]here is a growing recognition that the issue is not the "right to
intervene" of any State, but the "responsibility to protect" of every State
when it comes to people suffering from avoidable catastrophe-mass
murder and rape, ethnic cleansing by forcible expulsion and terror, and
deliberate starvation and exposure to disease.
26
Having examined the prior failures of collective security, the Panel
concluded:
We endorse the emerging norm that there is a collective
international responsibility to protect, exercisable by the Security
Council authorizing military intervention as a last resort, in the event of
genocide and other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious
violations of international humanitarian law which sovereign
Governments have proved powerless or unwilling to prevent.
27
The Panel enumerated five basic criteria of legitimacy regarding the Security
Council's authorizing or endorsing the use of military force: seriousness of threat;
proper purpose; last resort; proportional means; and balance of consequences
(reasonable chance of success, and consequences of action not likely to be worse
than the consequences of inaction).28 It called upon the Security Council and
General Assembly to embody these guidelines in declaratory resolutions.
29
Another major study undertaken pursuant to the U.S. Congress's action
establishing a bipartisan taskforce on the United Nations (co-chaired by George
Mitchell and Newt Gingrich) urged the United States in its June 2005 report 3° to
"endorse and call on the UN Security Council and General Assembly to affirm a
responsibility of every sovereign government to protect its own citizenry and those
within its borders from genocide, mass killing, and massive and sustained human
rights violations.",31 It recommended that the United States lead the Security
Council "in finding the most effective action across the full range of legal,
economic, political, and military tools," and that the U.S. "should strongly support
the creation of an enhanced and effective capability within the U.N. system to
identify these threats before they fully develop." 32  Among other
recommendations, the report calls for regional organizations and member states to
26. Id. para. 201, emphasis in original.
27. Id. para. 203.
28. Id. para. 207.
29. Id. para. 208.
30. U.S. Institute of Peace, American Interests and UN Reform (Report of the Task Force on the
United Nations), June 2005 [hereinafter U.S. Institute of Peace].
31. Id. at 28.
32. Id. at 30.
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act for humanitarian purposes in case the Security Council is unable to take
effective action in such situations.
33
In response to the ongoing debate on the responsibility to protect, the World
Summit endorsed the emerging norm that each individual state has the
responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic
cleansing, and crimes against humanity, and it called upon the international
community to support the U.N. in establishing an early warning capability.34 It
also placed responsibility on the international community, through the United
Nations, to help to protect populations from these crimes in accordance with the
U.N. Charter. This responsibility includes taking collective action, decisively and
in a timely fashion, through the Security Council, under Chapter VII of the U.N.
Charter "on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional
organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national
authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations" from these crimes.35
The Summit asked the General Assembly to continue consideration of this
responsibility in light of principles of the U.N. Charter and international law. The
Summit added, "[w]e also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and
appropriate, to helping States build capacity to protect their populations from
[these crimes] and to assisting those which are under stress before crises and
conflicts break out." 36 It also supported the mission of the Special Advisor of the
Secretary General on the Prevention of Genocide.37
This statement demonstrates an unambiguous acceptance of the principle that
the Security Council must assume collective responsibility to act under Chapter
VII as a last resort. It thereby puts to rest the question of validity regarding the use
of force in the face of the Article 2(7) prohibition of intervention in internal affairs.
However, notwithstanding the Security Council authority under the U.N. Charter
to use force if it determines that there is a threat to international peace and security,
the Summit's endorsement must be followed by the adoption of resolutions by both
the Security Council and the General Assembly enumerating guidelines for the use
of force by the Security Council, as recommended by the High-Level Panel in its
report. These guidelines will lend credibility to the decision-making process in the
Security Council and legitimacy to any eventual decision by it to use force.
Two further concerns must be addressed. First, the threshold for taking
collective action should include massive and sustained violations of human rights,
which the current recommendations do not explicitly include as a basis for taking
collective action. Second, a crucial issue for the implementation of the Summit's
mandate relates to the composition of the Security Council itself. It may be
recalled that the High-Level Panel had presented alternatives for reforming the
Security Council, for it had found the challenge "to increase both the effectiveness
33. Id. at 31.
34. World Summit Outcome, supra note 7, para. 138.
35. Id. para. 139.
36. Id.
37. Id. para. 140.
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and the credibility of the Security Council and, most importantly, to enhance its
capacity and willingness to act in the face of threats. 3 8 A perennial criticism has
been that the present membership of the Security Council is not representative of
the broader U.N. membership, especially of the developing world, and that the
Council should be perceived as democratic and accountable. However,
negotiations at the U.N. for Security Council reform have not yet been fruitful.
III. STRENGTHENING THE OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS
In his March 2005 report, the Secretary General referred to the reaffirmation
by the Millennium Declaration in 2000 of the U.N. mission and commitment "to
striving for a world of peace and justice grounded in universal respect for human
rights,, 39 and asked the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights to submit a
plan of action to strengthen her office within 60 days.40
On May 26, 2005, the High Commissioner submitted a strategic plan for the
future of OHCHR, aimed at strengthening the Office so that it could "play its
central role" in meeting the challenge of addressing today's threats to human rights
posed by "poverty, discrimination, conflict, impunity, democratic deficits and
institutional weaknesses [, which] will necessitate a heightened focus on
implementation."A' The plan envisages OHCHR action in five areas: 1) greater
country engagement to address the challenge of implementation at the country
level so that the human rights rhetoric can be translated into reality; 2) an enhanced
human rights leadership role for the High Commissioner within the U.N. system to
allow the Office to be more proactive and engaged in identifying problems and
proposing solutions so that it can meet human rights challenges and prevent
violations; 3) a closer relationship with U.N. agencies and civil society; 4)
partnership with various U.N. human rights treaty bodies and increased support to
special procedures of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, aimed at ensuring
better coordination within the U.N. system and a more coherent functioning of the
U.N. machinery; and 5) building OHCHR's administrative and management
capacity to ensure that it can effectively implement its strategic plan.42
The High Commissioner outlined the plan 43 after identifying situations that
give rise to human rights challenges-such as poverty, armed conflict, democracy
deficits, and weak institutions44-and the challenge of implementation at the
38. High-Level Panel Report, supra note 22, para. 248.
39. In Larger Freedom, supra note 2, para. 141.
40. Id. para. 145.
41. The Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human
Rights for All, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005/Add. 3, Annex, at 2, May 26, 2005.
42. Id. paras. 127-158, which contain action points identified by the High Commissioner.
43. Id. paras. 45-126.
44. Id. paras. 10-20.
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national level-including the knowledge gap, the capacity gap, the commitment
gap, and the security gap 4 -in light of the goals she has set out of protection and
empowerment.46
The High Commissioner's proposed plan is ambitious and forward-looking.
It will, however, require a considerable infusion of new human and financial
resources for its implementation, as the following highlights demonstrate. She
calls for greater dialogue and engagement with countries,47 which will require an
increase in country-focused staff and expertise, as well as expanded OHCHR
presence at the country, regional, and sub-regional levels. She seeks development
of a rapid response capacity to deploy human rights officers at short notice, a more
effective involvement of the Office in U.N. peace operations, and increased
support and legal expertise in crisis situations and in post-conflict settings to help
commissions of inquiry or fact-finding missions engaged in investigating severe
and widespread abuses. Also, she would strengthen the Office's technical
cooperation assistance for human rights reform and strengthen expertise and
capacity in such areas as human rights law, policy and institutions; human rights
education, investigation, monitoring, training, and programming; and research and
policy analysis. The High Commissioner envisages creating a new Policy and
Planning unit and a Legal unit.
Highlights regarding the High Commissioner's proposed leadership role
within the U.N. system48 include establishing a unit to work on the U.N.
Millennium Development Goals and to expand the Office's capacity to play a more
active role in the deliberations of the Security Council, especially in the areas of
peacekeeping and peacebuilding, as well as promotion of the rule of law. The
High Commissioner envisages publishing an annual thematic Global Human
Rights Report and launching a Global Campaign for Human Rights as part of the
Office's expanded outreach and communications functions so as to effectively
build public support for human rights principles.
The High Commissioner's plan for working with U.N. human rights bodies
49
includes providing more resources to human rights treaty bodies for analytical and
organizational operations and seeking the establishment of a unified standing treaty
body. Also, the Office is to increase its capacity to address issues related to
coordination, overlapping mandates, and increase in the number of special
procedures-rapporteurs, working groups, and experts appointed by the U.N.
Commission on Human Rights. In the High Commissioner's proposed work with
the U.N. agencies and civil society, including academia,50 she intends to provide
more effective support to country teams with advice, training, and increased
support to civil society.
45. Id. paras. 22-32.
46. Id. paras. 33-39.
47. Id. paras. 45-74, 127-133.
48. Id. paras. 75-88, 145-150.
49. Id. paras. 89-105, 145-150.
50. Id. paras. 106-114, 142-144.
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The High Commissioner proposes building OHCHR capacity,5 which
includes creating a centrally placed planning, monitoring, and evaluation unit,
increasing staff with geographical balance and establishing a more substantial
presence in New York, where major U.N. bodies and functions are centralized.
Currently, the human rights program receives only 1.8 percent of the U.N.
budget and the bulk of OHCHR's activities are financed by extra-budgetary
contributions, as out of the total 2004 annual budget of $86.4 million, $33.8
million was from the regular budget while $52.6 million came from voluntary
contributions.52 The High Commissioner anticipates that the plan will require
doubling the Office's resources over the next five to six years.
As usual, the September 2005 World Summit's rhetoric was impressive,
resolving to strengthen the U.N. Human Rights machinery 53 and improve the
effectiveness of the human rights treaty bodies by specifying the means to do so,
"through more timely reporting, improved and streamlined reporting procedures
and technical assistance to States to enhance their reporting capacities and further
enhance the implementation of their recommendations. ' 54  The Summit further
resolved to "integrate the promotion and protection of human rights into national
policies and to support the further mainstreaming of human rights throughout the
United Nations system, as well as closer cooperation between the Office of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and all relevant United
Nations bodies." 55
The Summit supported the promotion of human rights.16 It reaffirmed its
commitment to advance the human rights of indigenous peoples 57 and recognized
the special needs of women and children, 58 persons with disabilities,59 and
minorities.60
As to strengthening the OHCHR, the Summit resolved to do so, taking note of
the High Commissioner's plan of action, especially noting the need to respond to
the challenges, "particularly in the areas of technical assistance and capacity-
building, through the doubling of its regular budget resources over the next five
years with a view to progressively setting a balance between regular budget and
voluntary contributions to its resources.... It also leant its support to closer
cooperation of the Office with all relevant U.N. bodies, including the Security
Council, the General Assembly, and the Economic and Social Council. 62
51. Id. paras. 115-126, 151-158.
52. Id. para. 3.
53. World Summit Outcome, supra note 7, para. 123.
54. Id. para. 125.
55. Id. para. 126.
56. Id. para. 131.
57. Id. para. 127.
58. Id. para. 128.
59. Id. para. 129.
60. Id. para. 130.
61. Id. para. 124.
62. Id.
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The critical question is whether this rhetoric will be translated into reality.
The need to provide more resources to allow the U.N. human rights machinery to
function effectively has been evident for years. Thus, the budgetary decisions and
the necessary actions at the U.N. in support of the promises of the Summit will
largely determine the answer to this question.
63
IV. THE PROPOSED HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL
There is consensus on reforming the U.N. Commission on Human Rights.
The 53-member Commission has been criticized on several grounds, primarily that
it is politicized, selective, using double standards, and ineffective. 64 Several recent
reports have suggested that the Commission be replaced by a nimble and effective
Human Rights Council. One such recommendation came from the task force of
the American Bar Association's Section on International Law,65 which was
established in January 2004 and issued its report in August 2005.66
The task force, on which I served, began its report by providing a rationale for
replacing the Commission with a Human Rights Council:
The inherently political nature of an intergovernmental body such
as the Commission inevitably limits its ability to function as the beacon
of human rights envisioned when it was created in 1946. This situation
is exacerbated by its relatively large size (53 Member States), status as a
subsidiary of ECOSOC [Economic and Social Council] and limited
meeting schedule (once a year apart from special sessions).
The standing of the Commission was severely compromised by the
selection of Libya as Chair, the re-election of Sudan as a member in the
63. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on Implementation of decisions from
the 2005 World Summit Outcome for action by the Secretary-General, 23, delivered to the General
Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/60/430, (Oct 25, 2005):
The stipulated doubling of the regular budget resources of OHCHR over the next five years . . . is
essential to strengthening the Office to enable it to effectively carry out its mandate to respond to the
broad range of human rights challenges facing the international community, particularly in the areas of
technical assistance and capacity-building.
64. At the meeting of the Third Committee (Social, Humanitarian and Cultural) of the General
Assembly in New York, October 26-28, 2005, the Norwegian representative used the terms,
"politicized," "selective" and "ineffective," while Vietnam's representative said that selectivity and
double standards had politicized the Commission. Press Release, General Assembly, Proposed Human
Rights Council Must be Broadly Based, Avoiding Politicization of Past, Assembly's Social Committee
Told: Creation of Body Seen as Opportunity to Rectify Current Weaknesses, Strengthen Role of United
Nations in Key Area, U.N. Doe. GA/SHC/3833 (Oct. 31, 2005), available at
www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/gashc3833.doc.
65. Chaired by David E. Birenbaum, former U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. for U.N. Management
and Reform with Professors Paul R. Williams and Michael P. Scharf as Co-Rapporteurs. The task force
included officials of the U.S. government, think tanks, NGOs, and former ambassadors of the U.S. to
the Commission.
66. The chair of the Section of International Law, Kenneth B. Reisenfeld, submitted the report.
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midst of the genocide in Darfur, and the shameful failure of the
Commission last year to adopt a resolution clearly condemning that
genocide.
67
While the task force was deliberating, the Secretary-General's High Level
Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change published its report, in which it stated
that in the recent past, the Commission's capacity to perform its tasks of:
[P]romoting respect for human rights globally, fostering
international cooperation in human rights, responding to violations in
specific countries and assisting countries in building their human rights
capacity, . . has been undermined by eroding credibility and
professionalism .... We are concerned that in recent years States have
sought membership of the Commission not to strengthen human rights
but to protect themselves against criticism or to criticize others. The
Commission cannot be credible if it is seen to be maintaining double
standards in addressing human fights concerns.
68
The High-Level Panel recommended universal membership on the
Commission, which "would underscore that all members are committed by the
Charter to the promotion of human rights, and might help to focus attention back
on to substantive issues rather than who is debating and voting on them." 69 In his
response to the Panel's recommendations, the Secretary-General in his December
2004 note to the General Assembly commended the Panel's report to the General
Assembly, noting that, as the Commission was undermined by its declining
credibility and professionalism, "a credibility deficit has developed, which casts a
shadow on the reputation of the United Nations system as a whole., 70 However,
he did not accept the Panel's recommendation of universal membership on the
Commission, but instead suggested that "Member States should agree to replace
the Commission... with a smaller standing Human Rights Council.",71 He added:
Member States would need to decide if they want the Human Rights Council
to be a principal organ of the United Nations or a subsidiary body of the General
Assembly, but in either case its members would be elected directly by the General
Assembly by a two-thirds majority of members present and voting. The creation
of the Council would accord human rights a more authoritative position,
corresponding to the primacy of human rights in the Charter of the United Nations.
Member States should determine the composition of the Council and the term of
office of its members. Those selected to the Council should undertake to abide by
the highest human rights standards.72
67. Replacing the Commission on Human Rights With a Human Rights Council 2005 A.B.A. Sec.
Int'l L. Rep 8, app. 1, § I [hereinafter ABA Report] (copy of the manuscript on file with the Denver
Journal of International Law & Policy).
68. High-Level Panel Report, supra note 22, paras. 282-283.
69. Id. para. 285.
70. In Larger Freedom, supra note 2, para. 182.
71. Id. para. 183.
72. Id.
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Subsequently, on May 23, 2005, the Secretary-General provided a detailed
proposal regarding the establishment of the Human Rights Council.7 3  He
recommended that the Council be a standing body with smaller membership, to be
elected by the entire membership of the General Assembly, and to be located in
Geneva.74 He had earlier stated a peer review function for the Human Rights
Council:
It should have an explicitly defined function as a chamber of peer
review. Its main task would be to evaluate the fulfillment by all States
of all their human rights obligations .... And it should be equipped to
give technical assistance to States and policy advice to States and
United Nations bodies alike. Under such a system, every Member State
could come up for review on a periodic basis. Any such rotation should
not, however, impede the Council from dealing with any massive and
gross violations that might occur. Indeed, the Council will have to be
able to bring urgent crises to the attention of the world community.
75
He called upon the Summit to decide upon the details pertaining to the
mandate, function, composition and status as a principal or subsidiary body.7 6
The ABA task force agreed with the Secretary-General's proposal. It also
suggested that the Council should have co-equal status with ECOSOC and the
General Assembly but as this would require amendment of the Charter, it
suggested that in the interim the Council may be established as a subsidiary body
of the General Assembly and that it could be converted into a free-standing body
when Charter amendments were next presented to the membership.77 It further
suggested that to fulfill its mission and avoid the Commission's failings, the
Human Rights Council should:
[E]stablish procedures and implement a program of strong
initiatives to ensure the protection of these fundamental rights, including
aggressive investigations, public hearings, and reports to the Security
Council when there is evidence that an egregious violation has occurred.
These efforts should not detract from the attention given to other human
rights abuses within the jurisdiction of the Council. 78
The task force made two further suggestions in this regard: one, the Council
should strive to establish a highly professional investigative process, especially a
strong rapporteur system, and strengthened human rights treaty bodies; and two,
the Council should promptly bring attention to conflicts that could result in ethnic
73. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on In Larger Freedom: Towards
Development, Security and Human Rights for All, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005 Add. I (May 23, 2005)
[hereinafter Explanatory Note].
74. Id. paras. 4-5.
75. Speech to the Commission on Human Rights (April 7, 2005), quoted in id. para. 6.
76. Explanatory Note, supra note 73, paras. 9-14.
77. ABA Report, supra note 67, at 9.
78. Id. at 11.
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cleansing and genocide, triggering international action to resolve such conflicts
and prevent atrocities.
79
The task force recommended that for the Council to be representative and
effective, the selection of a responsible and independent chairperson should be
ensured, and the reforms should include, in addition to the election by two-thirds
vote of the General Assembly, that any member state which is under censure of the
Human Rights Council or under Chapter VII action of the Security Council should
be prohibited from serving on the Council.8 ° In addition, it recommended that the
Council:
[A]dopt a Code of Conduct committing the Member States to
promote international protection of human rights; to honor international
human rights efforts; to cooperate with the investigative mechanisms of
the Council (specifically including cooperation with the rapporteurs
charged with investigating allegations of human rights abuses); and to
appoint as heads of their delegations persons with substantial human
rights expertise.
81
The proposed Code of Conduct includes states' commitment by virtue of their
membership on the Council to perform their obligations under international human
rights instruments to which they are a party and to give serious consideration to
ratification of those U.N. human rights treaties to which they are not yet a party.
States also commit to "protect their internal populations from genocide, ethnic
cleansing and serious violations of international humanitarian and human rights
law. 8 It enumerated certain obligations for member states on the Council,
including "undertaking a voluntary commitment not to abuse 'no-action'
procedures," cooperating with Council initiatives and the Council's investigative
mechanisms, and ensuring that special rapporteurs and other experts on mission are
provided appropriate privileges and immunities. 83 It added that a material breach
of these obligations may lead to censure, suspension, or ineligibility for future
membership.
84
The task force made further recommendations for certain measures to be
undertaken by the Human Rights Council aimed at strengthening the role of the
High Commissioner for Human Rights in relation to the Council, as compared with
the Commission.85 These include closer coordination by Special Rapporteurs with
the Office of the High Commissioner, and production and circulation by the High
Commissioner before the Council sessions of "(1) a comprehensive and up to date
compilation of recommendations made by thematic mechanisms, and (2) a
compilation by country of concerns and recommendations made by Special
79. Id. at 11-12.
80. Id. at 13-14.
81. Id. at 15.
82. Id. at 22.
83. Id. at 23.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 18-20.
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Rapporteurs and treaty bodies., 86 Also, it suggested that the Special Rapporteurs'
reports should be presented to the High Commissioner in a timely fashion and that
the High Commissioner's rule of law initiative should be supported with
appropriate levels of funding and cooperation of the Council's member states.
87
Finally, the task force made policy recommendations for the Council to
enhance the participation of NGO's, which include their access to the Council, the
continuation and expansion of the functions of an NGO liaison official appointed
by the High Commissioner, and enlargement of the opportunity for NGO's to
provide information to the Council.88
The Mitchell-Gingrich task force, discussed above, also recommended that
the U.S. government "support the creation of a Human Rights Council, ideally
composed of democracies, to monitor and enforce human rights. 89
The September 2005 World Summit resolved to create a Human Rights
Council, which it said should address violations of human rights, make
recommendations, and promote effective coordination, as well as mainstream
human rights within the U.N. system.90 It asked the General Assembly president
"to conduct open, transparent and inclusive negotiations... with the aim of
establishing the mandate, modalities, functions, size, composition, membership,
working methods and procedures of the Council. 91
The General Assembly has been discussing the details regarding the
establishment of the Council. Various suggestions have been forwarded regarding
the Council's membership, election, and mandate. It is hoped that all these issues
will be finalized at the ongoing negotiations of the current (60th) session of the
General Assembly by March 2006.92 Several NGO's have submitted their
recommendations to member states engaged in consultations and negotiations.93
V. CONCLUSION
The developments discussed here to strengthen the existing U.N. machinery
to protect human rights are indeed promising. Notwithstanding the pivotal role of
86. Id. at 18-19 (emphasis in original).
87. Id. at 19.
88. Id. section VI, at 21.
89. U.S. Institute of Peace, supra note 30, at 34-35.
90. World Summit Outcome, supra note 7, para. 157, 159.
91. Id. para. 160.
92. "The President of the General Assembly mentioned that the most pressing negotiation was on
the Human Rights Council; he hoped to finalize the work in the next month." Press Release, General
Assembly, Summary of Press Briefing in Vienna by General Assembly President on Follow-Up to
World Summit, U.N. Doc. GA/SM/368 (Jan. 24, 2006).
93. See, e.g., Letter from 33 NGO's to Permanent Representatives and Member States of the
Convening Group of the U.N. Democracy Caucus (Jan. 24, 2006), available via Human Rights Watch
at http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/01/24/globa12527_txt.htm; Letter from 160 NGO's to foreign
ministers of U.N. member states and U.N. permanent representatives (Jan. 19, 2006), available via
Human Rights Watch at www.globalpolicy.org/reform/topics/hrc/2006/0119elements.htm; Joint letter
from the Global Policy Forum to Jan Eliasson, President of the General Assembly on the UN Human
Rights Council (Nov. 1, 2005), available at www.globalpolicy.org/reform/hrc/1 101joint.htm (signed by
several NGOs).
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human rights in the maintenance of international peace and security, neither the
High Commissioner for Human Rights nor the U.N. Commission on Human
Rights has received adequate resources to function effectively. Perhaps the cause
is, in part, their location in Geneva while major U.N. bodies and activities are
centered in New York, or perhaps it is the baggage of history, for the Commission
has only gradually and incrementally started functioning to fulfill its mandate and
that, too, primarily through special procedures-rapporteurs, working groups, and
experts. Further, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights was
created at a much later date, and there has been little clarity regarding the
relationship between the Commission and the High Commissioner's Office.
Strengthening the Office of the High Commissioner and replacing the
Commission with an effective Council are necessary first steps. Recognition of the
obligation to protect is a momentous new step. Its endorsement by member states
should be a precursor to creating the necessary mechanisms that will allow
effective responses to massive and sustained violations of human rights, an
enormous challenge to the world community that has thus far gone unaddressed.

